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Abstract In recent years, researchers have observed the
process of mainstreaming Fair Trade and the emergence of
alternative sustainability standards in the coffee industry.
The underlying market dynamics that have contributed
to these developments are, however, under-researched.
Insight into these dynamics is important to understand how
markets can develop to favor sustainability. This study
examines the major developments in the market for certi-
fied coffee in the Netherlands. It finds that, in the creation
of a market for sustainable coffee, decisions that signifi-
cantly influence market creation are made in the lead
companies (retailers and coffee roasters). These decisions
are made possible by the availability of multiple systems of
sustainability standards and by the existence of a small
segment of loyal Fair Trade customers that ensured that
sustainability remained an issue on the coffee market in the
years before the market creation took-off. Fair Trade did
not become the new rule in this process, but it became the
benchmark against which companies could compare
themselves and the basis upon which they built in adopting
or developing new standards that would be more feasible in
their business models.
Keywords Standards  Fair trade 
Sustainable development  Coffee  Certification
Abbreviations
ACC Ahold Coffee Company
AH Albert Heijn
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
DE Douwe Egberts
Introduction
The coffee market has undergone many changes in recent
decades with respect to sustainability (e.g., Kolk 2005).
This case study describes how the market for sustainable
coffee in the Netherlands developed from a market share of
\1% in the mid-1980s to 45% in 2010, with a share of
75% projected by 2015. In this study, ‘‘sustainable’’ is
defined as compliance with standards for the social and
environmental aspects of production and trade. The
establishment of standards is an increasingly important
instrument to improve environmental and social sustain-
ability in supply chains that originate from developing
countries (e.g., Barrientos et al. 2003; Giovannucci and
Ponte 2005; World Bank 2002). With approximately 20
different systems of sustainability standards, including
Rainforest Alliance, Starbucks, and Utz Certified, the
coffee industry is, in this respect, a forerunner (Kolk 2005).
Previous research on standards has examined the ethical
content of standards and the degree to which market actors
comply with them (e.g., Healy and Iles 2002; Kolk and Van
Tulder 2002). The multi-stakeholder process in which stan-
dards are formulated has also been analyzed (Ingenbleek
et al. 2007; Ingenbleek and Immink 2010), but the market
process in which companies decide to adopt standards and
thereby create a market for sustainable products has not been
studied. This study is the first to describe this process, from
the introduction of a Fair Trade product, Max Havelaar
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coffee, to the subsequent creation of a market for sustainable
products. Although Max Havelaar coffee was the first Fair
Trade product introduced in the mainstream supermarket
channel anywhere in the world, the process of its introduc-
tion and its subsequent role in competition with other stan-
dards has not yet been extensively reported in the academic
literature.
A detailed description of this case is important to better
understand the role of Fair Trade. Mainstreaming is
regarded by an increasing number of scholars as one of the
most significant developments of the Fair Trade movement
(Moore 2004; Hira and Ferrie 2006). Researchers have
described the changes in the Fair Trade organization
(Moore 2004; Gendron et al. 2009; O¨zc¸ag˘lar-Toulouse
et al. 2009; Davies 2008), the role of commercial compa-
nies that adopt the Fair Trade certification system (Fridell
2008; Raynolds 2009; Reed 2008), and the role of specific
Fair Trade brands that have contributed to the growth of
Fair Trade products in mainstream distribution channels
(Davies et al. 2010; Randall 2005). Less attention has been
devoted to the role of Fair Trade in the dynamic market
processes, including the emergence of alternative sustain-
ability standards, which underlie the mainstreaming of
sustainability standards.
This case study is relevant for managers in other
industries because it may help them to understand the
development of multiple standard systems in their indus-
tries. The existence of multiple standards systems may
involve strategic, as well as ethical, decisions about which
standard-formulating organization to join. In addition, this
study is relevant for public policy-makers who aim to
implement sustainability practices by encouraging market
actors to adopt sustainability standards. A deeper under-
standing of what caused the creation of a market for sus-
tainable coffee may lead to a more effective deployment of
policy instruments, such as the regulation of sustainability
labels.
This study is structured as follows. We first briefly
describe the background of sustainability standards,
including Fair Trade, in international supply chains. Next,
we describe the chronological development of a market for
certified coffee in the Netherlands. This description ends
with our conclusions and discussion of implications. For a
description of the research method, please see ‘‘Appendix
1’’. ‘‘Appendix 2’’ contains materials that may facilitate
classroom discussion of the study.
Background on Sustainability Standards
and Fair Trade
Companies increasingly attach sustainability standards to
their criteria for safety and quality (Waddock and Bodwell
2004). These standards may include any type of responsi-
ble behavior, such as the way the company deals with
natural resources (e.g., forests in timber production), waste
materials, labor conditions, or social arrangements (e.g.,
maternity leave for employees). All these sustainability
standards have different set ups and incentive structures
and can be used in consumer and business-to-business
markets. In consumer markets, they are communicated as a
label (for example, the Fair Trade label). To primary pro-
ducers and intermediary traders in international supply
chains, standards are rules that they may voluntarily
comply with. By complying with the standards, producers
and traders receive licenses to sell, either a formal certifi-
cate or a designation of ‘‘preferred supplier’’ (Drumwright
1994; Ingenbleek et al., 2007; Maignan and McAlister
2003), because, by complying with the standards, they
transfer the positive traits of the standards to the customer
company.
If the customer company is the only one (or perhaps one
of the few) that offers sustainable products to the con-
sumer, this is likely to contribute to its Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) reputation. The CSR reputation may
in-turn contribute to a better evaluation of the products of
that company (Brown and Dacin 1997; Sen and Bhat-
tacharya 2001). However, when more companies adopt
standards, the differential advantage of the standards may
decrease and consumers may perceive the adoption of
standards as a requirement for a legitimate business. In
other words, rather than setting the company apart in terms
of CSR, the standards show that the company operates
within the norms of what is deemed appropriate in society
(cf. Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002).
According to institutional theory, sustainability stan-
dards are therefore institutions; they emerge from social
pressures to restore or improve the legitimacy of a com-
pany’s activities. In other words, under social pressure
from special-interest groups and/or media, companies may
voluntarily comply with standards to restore or maintain
their legitimacy. Specifically, the formulation of sustain-
ability standards is the so-called authorization process that
‘‘involves the development of rules or codes of conduct
that are deemed appropriate and require channel members
to seek voluntarily the approval of authorization agents’’
(Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002, pp. 86–87). The organi-
zations that develop these standards are called standard-
formulating organizations (Ingenbleek and Immink 2010).
The first standards for international supply chains were
likely developed by the Fair Trade movement itself. Moore
(2004, p. 74) and Redfern and Snedker (2002, p. 11)
describe the following goals of Fair Trade: ‘‘(1) To
improve the livelihoods and well-being of producers by
improving market access, strengthening producer organi-
zations, paying a better price and providing continuity in
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the trading relationship. (2) To promote development
opportunities for disadvantaged producers, especially
women and indigenous people, and to protect children from
exploitation in the production process. (3) To raise
awareness among consumers of the negative effects on
producers of international trade so that they exercise their
purchasing power positively. (4) To set an example of
partnership in trade through dialogue, transparency and
respect. (5) To campaign for changes in the rules and
practice of conventional international trade. (6) To protect
human rights by promoting social justice, sound environ-
mental practices and economic security.’’
The Fair Trade movement emerged in the middle of the
twentieth century from a general dissatisfaction with the
functioning of the capitalist system, which was accused of
being unfair to small-scale producers in developing
countries (Witkowski 2008). To connect consumers in
high-income countries directly with producer groups in
low-income countries, the Fair Trade movement developed
a network of World Shops which sold handicrafts and,
later, food products such as coffee, tea, and sugar (Gendron
et al. 2009). In these small-scale initiatives, there were
direct contacts between the charity groups that ran the
stores or organized the supply on their behalf and the
producer groups in developing countries. Consumers paid
price premiums for the products, and the earnings of the
stores were sent to missionaries or cooperatives to improve
the living standards of producers. There was no need for
formal standards at that time; these would emerge later
when the movement became professionalized and institu-
tionalized and increasingly started to penetrate mainstream
distribution channels. These developments will not be
described here in detail, as they are well described in other
studies (e.g., Moore 2004; Gendron et al. 2009; Hira and
Ferrie 2006).
Davies (2008) as well as Davies and colleagues (2010)
recognize three phases in the development of the Fair
Trade movement. A solidarity era prior to 1990 during
which the first contacts were established between producer
organizations in developing countries and ethically driven
entrepreneurs in the North was followed by a phase from
1990 to 2002 in which Fair Trade tried to compete on the
open market with products of better quality than those sold
during the solidarity era. Finally, the mass market era (from
2002 onwards) is characterized by brand alliances and
differentiation of Fair Trade products at different price-
quality levels. Our case description roughly follows the
latter two phases of development and will show that Fair
Trade was joined by rival standard-formulating organiza-
tions in the second and third phases. It will also highlight
the dynamics among these organizations in the institutional
environment in relation to brand competition in the market
environment. Figure 1 summarizes our findings in a time-
line depicting the major developments and events in the
Dutch market for coffee, while Table 1 provides an over-
view of the different sustainability standards and their
logos that are discussed in this study.
The Dutch Coffee Market in the Solidarity Era
(Before 1988)
Before the emergence of retailers’ private coffee brands,
coffee roasters were the sole lead companies in the Dutch
coffee chain. During the 1980s, they had either a national
or, at best, a European orientation. Coffee roasters source
their coffee beans from tropical countries in Latin America,
Asia, and Africa. Although there are several varieties of
coffee beans (such as Arabica and Robusta), coffee beans
are traded as commodities at institutions like the New York
Board of Trade. The market functions, therefore, much like
an anonymous spot market in which market prices for
coffee beans fluctuate with changes in supply and demand.
Between the coffee roasters and the primary producers, a
multitude of traders and transporters may be involved;
these include importing companies, exporting companies,
Fig. 1 Overview of major events and developments in the Dutch coffee market
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national marketing boards, and transporters/traders who
purchase coffee beans from individual primary producers
or cooperatives.
In the 1980s, the Dutch coffee market consisted of two
major channels. First, the larger coffee roasters served the
supermarket channel, where consumers bought their coffee
for home use. Second, many Dutch consumers drank their
coffee away from home, either at work or at bars and
restaurants. The vending machines at work places and
offices were generally supplied by the large coffee roasters,
whereas three or four smaller coffee roasters focused on
bars and restaurants by producing specialized coffee of
refined quality. In the 1980s, the supermarket channel was
dominated by three brands, of which Douwe Egberts (DE)
was most prominent. DE was a typical traditional Dutch
brand, and the Dutch were very familiar with its typical
flavor, which was created by combining different types of
beans. It was often said that ‘‘DE taught the Dutch how to
drink coffee.’’ By promoting coffee drinking as a social
event shared with family and friends, the DE brand had
become a part of Dutch culture. As market leader, DE also
had the strongest voice in the industry organization of
Dutch coffee roasters.
In the mid-1980s, coffee became the subject of a
political controversy that created an uproar in the Neth-
erlands. In several Latin American countries, such as El
Salvador and Nicaragua, left-wing governments had come
to power. Following the rationales of the Cold War,
coffee farmers in these countries were excluded from the
world market for political reasons. Activist groups blamed
the coffee industry and developed plans to break the
power of the dominant firms in the coffee chain. These
groups created an atmosphere conducive to new ideas
intended to dramatically reorganize economic systems.
The Fair Trade movement, for example, experienced an
increase of sales of ‘‘alternative’’ products in churches
and World Shops during these years. One of these prod-
ucts was coffee, made with coffee beans from El Salva-
dor. One respondent explained how this coffee served
primarily as a political statement rather than a beverage:
‘‘The taste was considered unimportant relative to the
political message, and it therefore tasted terrible.’’ The
market share of this product was negligible on the Dutch
coffee market. However, it was in this environment that
the idea for Fair Trade coffee in the mainstream super-
market channel emerged.
Table 1 Different sustainable coffee standards
Fairtrade/Max Havelaar Utz Kapeh (Utz Certified) Rainforest Alliance
Label
Mission To ensure equitable trading
arrangements for disadvantaged
producers
To enable coffee producers and brands
to show their commitment to
sustainable development in a market
driven way
Integrate productive agriculture,
biodiversity conservation, and human
development
Brief
summary of
standards
Primary producers receive a minimum
price that covers their costs of living.
To qualify, smallholders have to be
organized into producer groups or
cooperatives which must be
democratically run and politically
independent
Sets environmental and social
requirements, as well as cost-saving
arrangements within the coffee chain.
On each issue of the certification
scheme, producers receive a certain
score. No minimum price guarantee for
farmers
Certification is built on the three pillars
of sustainability—environmental
protection, social equity and economic
viability. Emphasis on how farms are
managed, rather than how products are
traded. Requires a minimum 30%
certified content for companies who
want to use the label. No minimum
price guarantee for farmers
Organization
and control
The Fair Trade Labeling Organizations
International (FLO) secures the
fundamental principles of the Fair
Trade label
Utz Kapeh is an independent nonprofit
organization supported by several
charity groups. Control is outsourced
to independent organizations
To earn certification, a farm must meet
the standards of the Sustainable
Agriculture Network (SAN). The SAN
standards include environmental
criteria and worker protection issues
Financial
viability
Consumer is paying the higher price for
enabling farmers to differentiate
themselves from mainstream
production
Retailers and coffee roasters should
internalize higher costs. Utz aims to
offer coffee at competitive prices
Certification helps to increase efficiency
and improve quality. Price premiums
can be received by quality
improvements
Source adapted from Consumers International (2005) and Ingenbleek and Meulenberg (2006)
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In 1986, Nico Roozen, a new employee of the Dutch
Catholic development organization Solidaridad, which was
active in the Fair Trade movement, visited Latin America.
He spent considerable time with missionary Frans van der
Hoff at Uchiri, a cooperative of coffee farmers in Mexico.
This trip provided Roozen significant insight into how the
coffee market functioned from the perspective of primary
producers. Roozen witnessed the social consequences of
the system for the coffee farmers, who claimed that, instead
of development aid, they preferred a fair price for their
products. Roozen and Van der Hoff decided to collaborate:
Van der Hoff would organize the supply chain in Mexico,
and Roozen would organize the demand among roasters
and supermarkets for Max Havelaar coffee in the Nether-
lands. Thus, the plan to put a Fair Trade product in a
marketing channel was born.
The goal was to develop a label for the coffee that could
be used by existing brands as an extension of their product
line. At the time, the name Fair Trade was not yet well
established, so the label used the name Max Havelaar. This
name was derived from the main character of a famous
nineteenth century novel that described the injustices of the
Dutch colonial system in the coffee-growing areas of
Indonesia. Consumers would pay a premium price for the
labeled coffee, while producers would be paid a minimum
price that covered the costs for development of their
livelihoods.
Back in the Netherlands, Roozen realized that he needed
an alliance with an established company in the coffee
industry, and he therefore decided to visit all the major
players in the industry. Before he could do so, however, he
first had to convince people in his own organization that
‘‘talking to the enemy’’ was really necessary. The second
problem that he encountered was whom to contact at the
coffee companies. CSR was not well established in this
industry at the time. Most companies considered their
relationships with alternative trade movements to be in the
category of ‘‘damage control,’’ which was the responsi-
bility of a public relations manager. In most companies,
however, decision-making authority lay with the CEO of
the company. It took Roozen almost 3 years to make
contact with all the companies on his list.
The End of the Solidarity Era: The Introduction
of Max Havelaar (1988–1990)
As the Netherlands was the first country and the coffee
industry was the first industry where a mainstream Fair
Trade product was being launched, the initiative was fun-
damentally new: company managers within the industry
had no reference points from other industries or countries.
Although coffee roasters had become aware of the
problems in the coffee-growing countries, these companies
had regarded those problems as inevitable in a market
economy. Low prices were explained as resulting from
overproduction. If injustice was done to coffee producers,
the companies considered remedies to be the responsibility
of local governments, not of the industry. The latter was
considered only responsible for producing coffee for con-
sumers and profits for its shareholders. ‘‘Coffee and politics
shouldn’t mix’’ was the general opinion in the industry, as
expressed by one respondent.
Roozen was taken seriously by the coffee roasters: his
idea was perceived as a serious threat to the coffee business
as it had long been operated by the existing companies. At
market leader DE, Roozen had six or seven subsequent
meetings about his ideas. DE was, however, no longer the
family business that it had been for decades. In 1984, the
company was sold to multinational Sara Lee. This takeover
led to a change in strategic direction. Plans to expand the
brand internationally were abandoned, and the company,
with its dominant domestic market position, was added to
its new owner’s portfolio as a ‘‘cash cow.’’ This change in
strategy was accompanied by a change of CEO at DE. The
new CEO was described by one of his employees as a
‘‘calculator’’ and a ‘‘typical rationally-thinking manager,’’
a description that fit the company’s new strategy.
The new strategy at DE would have a strong impact on
how the company would respond to the Max Havelaar
initiative. To estimate the potential market share of the
Max Havelaar coffee, both Solidaridad and DE conducted
market surveys. As Roozen said
At that moment, I was really convinced that we
would conquer a 7 to 15% market share. That was not
wishful thinking, but those were predictions on the
basis of market research. This result was consistent
from both our own studies and the ones from DE that
leaked and that we laid our hands on. All studies told
us that 7 to 15% of the Dutch consumers would be
willing to pay a little bit more for fair coffee than for
regular coffee.
Based on these predictions, market leader DE took a
well-supported and strategic position. According to Roo-
zen, the CEO of DE once told him: ‘‘I allow you 5 percent
maximum; otherwise, I will sweep you off the market, or I
will join you.’’ It seemed likely that, if Max Havelaar did
reach a market share of at least 5%, it would be more
profitable for DE to join the initiative. Solidaridad was,
therefore, eager to achieve a 5% market share because it
would give them bargaining power. Getting the market
leader on board would give the market for Fair Trade
coffee an enormous boost.
However, DE’s first option was to prevent the Max
Havelaar label from coming to the market in the first place,
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and indeed, it made great efforts to prevent a market entry.
DE used its power in the organization of Dutch coffee
roasters to convince coffee roasters not to join the initia-
tive. At his visits to those companies, Roozen was told
simply that they would not roast the certified coffee beans
and bring them to the market. This made it completely
impossible to enter the market with certified coffee.
Therefore, Roozen tried to circumvent DE’s power by
dealing directly with retailers. Initially, the new approach
seemed successful
At some point, we had Albert Heijn (AH) super-
markets [the leading retailer in the Netherlands] on
our side. They had agreed to develop a label with us
and to sell the labeled coffee in their stores. This
decision was called back by the president of the
company. I was told by my contact person at AH that
the president received a phone call from the president
of DE. After that, he had decided to cancel all con-
tacts with Solidaridad.
Another informant confirmed that the market entry was
essentially blocked by the domination of DE and AH in the
market. At this point, Solidaridad was left empty-handed,
and DE’s strategy seemed to have been effective.
Just as Solidaridad was about to conclude that entering
the market with Max Havelaar coffee was not possible, an
unexpected breakthrough occurred; one of the smaller
roasters, Neuteboom, suddenly offered to produce the Max
Havelaar coffee. This company had been active on the
retail market for several decades but had been squeezed out
of the market for home use coffee by the A-brands. Relying
on the out-of-home consumption market alone was an
undesirable position for the company because it operated
under capacity. The company urgently needed an oppor-
tunity to fill its capacity; otherwise, it would eventually go
bankrupt. When the major brands in the retail channel were
not willing to join with Solidaridad, Max Havelaar sud-
denly offered Neuteboom an opportunity to fill its capacity.
Neuteboom could, however, count on the efforts of DE to
stop them, as Roozen described
Right at the moment when I was there to sign the
contract, he received a phone call from the president
of DE personally, telling him that he would regret his
decision to produce Max Havelaar. I left him for a
moment, because I would understand it if he backed
off at that moment. He quickly followed me, how-
ever, telling me that if DE was afraid of it, that it
must be interesting enough to step in.
According to Jan-Willem Top, managing director at
Neuteboom, the company did not regard the market power
of DE as a major risk to their business at that time. Rather,
the main risk for Neuteboom was associated with the
supply chain: ‘‘There was, of course, a risk; you did not
know where the coffee came from. One of the first things
after we signed the contract was that someone visited one
of the producer’s countries, to see the farmers.’’ When
Neuteboom began working with Max Havelaar, Norbert
Douque´ (of the family-owned coffee trading company
Douque´) was called into organize the supply from Mexico,
operating as a separate business unit named Van Weely.
Initially, the initiative indeed seemed to produce what
Neuteboom wanted: a return to the supermarket channel
with its own brand, albeit this time with a Max Havelaar
label attached. Although AH supermarkets had initially
stepped away from the initiative, they seemed to change
their minds when Neuteboom agreed to produce the coffee.
AH placed a large order for Max Havelaar coffee with the
roasting company. The contracts were, however, not iron-
clad: when the roaster had made the necessary investments,
the order was suddenly canceled for no clear reason. This
seemed to be the final blow for the coffee roaster, which
was already in bad financial straits. Nevertheless, this event
led to a remarkable outcome: an investment (development
funding from a charity) from Solidaridad was used to save
the company from bankruptcy.
This appeared to be the final hurdle to the introduction
of Max Havelaar coffee. The product was introduced in
several supermarket channels in 1988. AH supermarkets
followed 4 months later, after receiving bad press and
complaints from concerned consumers.
The New Competitor is Ignored (1990–1996)
It was clear within a month. We saw it happening
immediately, that we would be stuck at 2% market
share, 3% at best. I was convinced that power would
be with the consumers, but it turned out otherwise.
Even taking into account the socially-desirable
responses in the market research, consumers are
agenda-setting to a very small extent, a very small
push factor. The market is made by the choices that
producers and retailers make. Consumers are much
more loyal to brands than we expected.
Thus, Roozen reflected on the introduction of Max
Havelaar. When it became clear that the market share of
Max Havelaar would not grow beyond 3%, there was no
serious incentive for DE to join the initiative. According to
Roozen, ‘‘they could finally ignore us, and they did so for
ten years, because Max Havelaar didn’t grow further.’’
Additionally, a CSR initiative targeted at coffee farmers,
which had been announced by the organization of Dutch
coffee roasters (most likely an attempt to safeguard its
reputation) shortly before the introduction of Max
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Havelaar, was cancelled. According to Norbert Douque´,
‘‘what has been killing for Max Havelaar was that there
was no roaster who was prepared to stick his neck out to
take responsibility for the marketing. When there are so
many different small roasters, no one is willing to adver-
tise, because then they would advertise for each other.’’
With no party willing or able to make substantial mar-
keting investments in Max Havelaar, the market remained
relatively stable over the next several years. The market
share of Max Havelaar did not grow beyond 3%, as is seen
in Fig. 2. Instead of devoting all its efforts to increasing the
market share in the Netherlands, the Fair Trade movement
focused during those years on internationalization of the
Max Havelaar certification concept and on diversification
into bananas and, subsequently, other tropical fruits. DE
established a charitable foundation in 2002 that financed
small development projects with coffee farmers, but this
effort never became part of its core processes. According to
a respondent, the DE president once said that ‘‘we have
given it a place now. It is no threat to us; it sticks to 2% of
the market, so we can ignore it.’’
Under cover of this stable market, several important
market trends took place. First, a trend of increasing con-
centration took place in the coffee industry. The largest
brand (DE) eventually acquired most of its competitors,
leading to a market share of approximately 70%. With the
removal of European trading barriers during the 1990s,
there was also a trend of increased internationalization.
Foreign players such as Nestle´ became more prominent in
the Dutch coffee market. Sara Lee began to strengthen its
grip on its daughter company, DE. A third trend was the
increasing market share of store brands (private labels) and
a growing concentration of coffee roasters that focused on
store brand manufacturing. According to an expert
respondent, the store brands’ market share grew with 7% at
the expense of the A-brands. Of the two or three companies
in this segment, the most prominent was the Ahold Coffee
Company (ACC), which sourced, branded, and packaged
coffee for the Ahold supermarkets in Europe and the US.
Finally, during the 1990 s, a trend toward higher product
quality and finer taste emerged. This trend resulted in the
entry of a few smaller brands (predominantly foreign, for
example, Italian) that focused on the high quality-high
price market, often selling through specialty stores that
began to emerge at that time.
At the producer level, a worldwide coffee production
crisis emerged during the 1990s. During the 1970s and
1980s, prices were well above 100 US cents/lb., but they
declined during the 1990s, reaching a low of 41.17 US
cents/lb. in September 2001 (whereas a Max Havelaar
farmer received 120 US cents/lb. at that time). Coffee
prices remained low until 2004. There are various reasons
for the steady price decrease. First, the International Coffee
Agreement, which had ensured a minimum price for coffee
since 1974, was abandoned in 1989 when there was no
longer pressure from communist countries to maintain it.
Second, production of coffee beans had increased with the
expansion of coffee production in Brazil and the market
entry of Vietnam following the end of the US trade
embargo in 1994 (Vietnam rapidly became the world’s
second largest coffee producer after Brazil). Third, some
argue that concentration in the international roaster market
(resulting in four large multinational roasting companies:
Procter & Gamble, Nestle´, Kraft, and Sara Lee) led to a
stronger focus on efficient sourcing.
Due to the crisis in coffee production, the role of the
large multinational roasting companies received more
attention, as their policies became more clearly linked to
growing poverty among coffee farmers. As a result, the
large coffee companies started to experience significant
social pressure (Kolk 2005). NGOs conducted campaigns
and actions were held. For example, according to the sus-
tainability manager of Douwe Egberts
When we celebrated our 250th anniversary in 2003
and coffee prices had reached their minimum, posters
Fig. 2 Market share of certified
coffee in the Netherlands
1989–2009. Source Coffee
Barometer (2009) and Oxfam
Novib (2010)
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were hung with texts like DE celebrates, but for most
of the coffee farmers it’s no party at all!
In response, CSR became more prominent within these
companies. According to one respondent, there emerged a
new generation of managers who had received training in
CSR during their management education. For example,
although the growing influence of Sara Lee on DE had
initially brought about more efficiency-oriented manage-
ment, a respondent working at DE reported that CSR
subsequently became a higher priority, as US companies
were also being held more accountable in their home
country for externalities in the coffee trade.
Mainstreaming Beyond Fair Trade: The Emergence
of Utz Kapeh (1996–2000)
These developments during the 1990s set the stage for the
first real follow-up to Max Havelaar in the Dutch coffee
market. In 1997, the ACC began to develop Utz Kapeh
(which can be translated from the Mayan language as ‘‘Good
Coffee’’). ACC was the private label coffee roaster for
Ahold, which sourced not only the AH supermarkets but also
the other Ahold supermarket formulas in Western Europe
and the US. As a result, Utz Kapeh has experienced signifi-
cant growth since the end of the 1990 s (the second largest
Dutch supermarket C1000 followed by adopting Utz Kapeh,
for example, in 2005). A strong driving force behind the
development of Utz Kapeh was Ward de Groote, managing
director of ACC, who had lived in Latin America for several
years and witnessed the impact of the coffee crisis on farmers
When I visited the origins of our supply chain, I saw
myself what had to be changed […] I had a passion to
help these farmers in the Third World […] We did
not see Fair Trade as a good solution because it was
based on positive discrimination, only small farmers
were allowed to participate in Fair Trade, and
because the certification system works with a mini-
mum price. Such a minimum price partly removes the
incentives for farmers to look for operational effi-
ciency and new technologies and this undermines the
position of the farmers in the long run.
The standards of Utz Kapeh are, therefore, different
from those of Fair Trade. In fact, development of the Utz
Kapeh standards was used as an opportunity to improve
upon the Fair Trade standards. One expert, therefore,
expressed the expectation that ‘‘the model of Utz will
eventually have more impact in the long term than the Max
Havelaar model.’’
Utz Kapeh establishes environmental and social
requirements, as well as cost-saving and quality-enhancing
standards, within the coffee chain. On each issue of the
certification scheme, producers receive a certain score. In
order to increase sustainability, the minimum required score
is increased over time. Compared to Fair Trade’s in-or-out
standard on mainly social issues, the more complex system
of Utz Kapeh is considered necessary to cover the many
different social and natural environments involved. Another
important difference between Max Havelaar and Utz Kapeh
is that Max Havelaar focuses on the consumer, who is paying
the price for the product’s social and environmental costs.
Utz Kapeh, on the other hand, requires retailers and coffee
roasters to internalize these additional costs. As a result,
one respondent argued that Utz is a ‘‘CSR concept,’’ whereas
Fair Trade is ‘‘a consumer label.’’ Although Utz allows
coffee roasters and retailers to use the label ‘‘Utz Certified,’’
the Utz strategy regards the company, rather than the con-
sumer, as the most important actor.
As already mentioned, another key difference is that Utz
does not pay primary producers a guaranteed minimum
price; rather, it helps them to be more efficient and to
produce higher quality coffee that generates a higher
market price. With this approach, long-term relationships
between roasters and producers should provide producers
more stability than a spot market can. As the former Utz
Kapeh manager David Rosenberg has argued
It is an integral project in which we offer tools to
participating coffee farmers to improve their business
processes. This pays off because, if a coffee farmer
implements a solid management system, he will run
his business more efficiently. Subsequently, we
reward that, following the rationale: I asked you for a
better product, and I am also willing to pay more for
it. That’s a big difference from Fair Trade coffee. If
you start talking about a higher price right away,
that’s the wrong way. Price is only one part of the
entire process. We target the large brands, the
mainstream market. The scale advantages keep prices
low. Our approach is commercial and competitive.
Remarkably, Solidaridad, the founding organization of
Max Havelaar, began to support Utz Kapeh financially in
1999. According to Roozen
I found out that you can’t turn Max Havelaar into a
mainstream system. DE would never accept that. For
its core product, a system should be implemented for
which price setting is not free because of a minimum
price guarantee. In a competitive market, this would
be impossible for such a company. They would be
competed out of the market during times of price
crises.
Although both organizations shared the objective of
reducing poverty among coffee growers, competitive
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tensions emerged between Max Havelaar and Utz Kapeh.
A Max Havelaar employee discussed the issue: ‘‘we are
very similar to each other because Utz Kapeh also has the
objective of mainstreaming sustainable coffee. There is, of
course, already Max Havelaar coffee, so there are a lot of
tensions.’’ According to Ward de Groote, a Max Havelaar
representative told him that PR and communication were
the domains of Max Havelaar, so he was not allowed to
seek media attention for Utz: ‘‘The reaction of Max
Havelaar was fierce, because they thought that they had the
press behind them.’’ Douque´ argued that the introduction of
Utz helped Max Havelaar to position itself as a quality
brand. Thus, behind the market competition between coffee
brands, rivalry emerged as well between the standard-for-
mulating organizations in the institutional environment.
Who is the Fairest of Them All? (2000–2006)
Utz Kapeh was adopted by the two leading supermarket
chains in the Netherlands to strengthen the CSR image of
their store brands, thus making coffee a central product in
their CSR policies. As a result, the third supermarket for-
mula on the market (Super de Boer) also felt pressure to
strengthen its quality image with an ambitious CSR strat-
egy. It, therefore, needed a certification system for its
private label coffee. Instead of adopting Utz Kapeh, how-
ever, it turned to Rainforest Alliance (and was sourcing
30% of its private label coffee from Rainforest Alliance in
2006). The Rainforest Alliance was established in the late
1980 s with the objective of halting deforestation by pro-
viding specific solutions to the problem, rather than merely
increasing public awareness. In 1989, it launched the for-
estry certification system Smartwood, and in 1991, intro-
duced the Rainforest Alliance label for bananas. In the
2000s, Rainforest Alliance also launched a certification
system for coffee. Growers are certified on the basis of
several standards: conserving local wildlife and water
resources, protecting forests (including reforestation where
possible), minimizing soil erosion, and treating workers
fairly. Comparable to Utz, the Rainforest Alliance system
offers growers the tools to lift themselves out of poverty
and open their markets to more profitable premium
products.
One respondent suggested that Super de Boer selected
Rainforest Alliance (even though it is based in New York),
because Utz was already strongly identified with other
brands; Super de Boer preferred a different label to support
its differentiation strategy. Super de Boer sources its coffee
from private label roaster De Drie Mollen, which also
supplies Rainforest Alliance coffee to the British market. In
addition to Rainforest Alliance, this roaster also offers Fair
Trade and Utz Kapeh, so it can proudly claim to offer its
customers all three certification systems in the coffee
industry.
One point of criticism leveled at Rainforest Alliance is
that they allow the use of their label on coffee containing a
minimum of 30% certified coffee beans. According to a
respondent from Drie Mollen
Rainforest Alliance started with 30% certified coffee
beans, because they wanted to slowly build their
market. When you start with 100% certified coffee,
you have the same problem as Max Havelaar: this
would be too expensive, and companies would not do
business with you.
Interestingly, for consumers, the involvement of lead
companies and the feasibility of organizing a certified
supply for them weighed more heavily than the desire for
100% certified products. In 2006, other retailers (Superu-
nie, Koopconsult) sourced at least 10% of their private
label coffee from certified sources.
The Market Leaders Follow
In an environment in which coffee brands continuously
developed new plans for certification, it is hard to imagine
that market leader DE would not take measures to improve
the ethical dimension of its brand, especially when DE’s
mother company, Sara Lee, became more actively involved
in providing certified coffee. Sara Lee began offering
Transfair coffee (the US-based Fair Trade coffee) on the
institutional market in the US after McDonald’s explicitly
requested the coffee for its restaurants. Moreover, accord-
ing to a DE employee, a new CEO at DE brought about a
wave of change to the inward-looking corporate culture of
the company. Finally, as already mentioned, when the
brand celebrated its 250th anniversary in 2003, it became
the target of a pressure campaign by NGOs.
In 2004, DE responded to this pressure and announced
that it would begin obtaining 4.5% of its coffee beans from
sources certified by Utz Kapeh. Currently, approximately
33% of DE’s coffee on the Dutch market can be labeled as
sustainable (Oxfam Novib 2010). DE’s ambition is to offer
100% certified coffee by 2017. According to a respondent
from DE, ‘‘the main trigger for our company to source
sustainable coffee was increased demand from large out-
of-home customers such as companies and ministries.
These customers started to adopt CSR in their policies,
which was also translated in the coffee that they wanted to
offer to their employees.’’ DE’s adoption of Utz was,
indeed, a true competitive move to strengthen its position
on the institutional market (i.e., offices, schools, and can-
teens). In 2007, DE sued the Dutch province of Groningen
for explicitly requiring its coffee suppliers to meet Fair
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Trade criteria; DE believed that this requirement excluded
its own Utz Certified coffee from the market. After several
months, the provincial authorities won the case. Coen de
Ruiter, director of the Max Havelaar Foundation, com-
mented on the case
It provides governmental institutions the freedom in
their purchasing policy to require suppliers to provide
coffee that bears the Fairtrade/Max Havelaar criteria,
so that a substantial and meaningful contribution is
made in the fight against poverty through the daily
cup of coffee.
DE may have lost a battle but has not yet lost the war. In
fact, as this study was being written, the Dutch government
was developing new criteria for its sustainable purchasing
policy that will apply to all governmental bodies and
offices. The latest information is that the Dutch government
will allow different certification systems, such as Fair
trade/Max Havelaar and Utz Certified. In the meantime,
DE has decided to add Fairtrade-certified coffee to their
product line. As of January 2011, Fairtrade-certified coffee
is offered to the out-of-home market.
Completing the Pyramid of Change
In 2007, 4C (Common Code for the Coffee Community)
emerged as another player in the arena of sustainable
coffee standards. Initiated by the German ministry of
development, 4C is ‘‘a floor initiative’’ that was adopted by
all large coffee roasters and NGOs in the world. The par-
ticipants aim to improve the sustainability of the entire
sector by setting minimum standards for the economic,
ecological, and social aspects of coffee production.
This code went into effect in 2007. As one respondent
described it,
The Common Code for the Coffee Community is a
round-table process for all parties: all large roasters,
production countries, and traders. Here, they try to
define some sort of minimum standard that works as a
license to operate in the sector. You can’t bring
coffee to the market if you haven’t organized a few
basic things.
Sustainability has become widely accepted in the
international coffee industry and actively used by compa-
nies to strengthen their market position: Starbucks laun-
ched its criteria for sourcing sustainable coffee in 1999;
Holiday Inn hotels and KLM began offering Rainbow
Alliance coffee; Ikea began serving Utz in its restaurants
around the world; Kraft offered a sustainable brand with
Rainbow Alliance coffee; Nestle´ began to offer a Fair
Trade product (questioning, in a press release, why other
companies did not adopt Fair Trade and instead chose
‘‘second best’’ standards systems). In 2007, ACC, together
with Solidaridad, introduced ‘‘Cafe´ Oke´,’’ a line of Fair
Trade brand coffee products with the Max Havelaar label.
According to a respondent from Drie Mollen,
Sustainability is now embedded within the industry
and society. […] External circumstances are chang-
ing; customers are asking for certified coffee. First,
you had to convince your customers several times
before they wanted to buy your sustainable coffee;
now they are demanding it. That’s the difference.
Roozen believes that sustainability standards can be
described as a pyramid, with on-the-floor initiatives that set
basic rules, such as 4C, on the bottom; CSR initiatives like
Utz and Rainforest Alliance in the middle; and consumer
labels like Fairtrade/Max Havelaar at the top (Fig. 3).
Sustainable development requires initiatives at all three
levels, according to Roozen
This is what I call the pyramid of change. In the
sector, you try to create dynamics where consumers
can express their preferences. Mainstream companies
can take responsibility for a mainstream product. This
will be done predominantly by the A-brands. Whe-
ther a company is able to internalize the higher costs
for sustainability depends on the positioning of the
brand. At Fair Trade, you let the consumer pay; about
3% of the market does that. With a CSR concept, you
should stick closer to the market; otherwise, they
can’t afford it, and then the mechanism won’t work.
At the same time, you should ensure that there are no
free riders at the bottom, no players that can ignore
the entire sustainability agenda.
According to a report by Oxfam Novib, in 2010, 45% of all
coffee consumed by Dutch consumers was certified
(Oxfam Novib 2010). Furthermore, on November 9,
2010, the Dutch Coffee and Tea Branch signed a Mem-
orandum of Understanding, declaring their intent that, by
2015, 75% of all coffee consumed and sold on the Dutch
market should be certified. This memorandum was sup-
ported by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs,
Agriculture and Innovation, as well as by supermarkets
and NGOs.
Discussion and Conclusion
Looking back on the introduction of Max Havelaar and
subsequent events on the Dutch coffee market, we can
conclude that, over the course of 20 years, a market for
sustainable coffee has been created. Sustainability stan-
dards have clearly become a critical success factor in the
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industry. The driving forces behind the creation of this
market were the competition between brands on the market
and the rivalry of multiple standards systems, or at least the
existence of multiple systems, in the institutional envi-
ronment. The first important step in the process was the
introduction of Max Havelaar. This brought a new com-
petitive dimension to the coffee market on which coffee
brands could potentially position themselves. As a second
step, the introduction of Utz Kapeh started a process that
would eventually affect nearly every brand in the market.
Suddenly, brand competition on the coffee market was no
longer a force that worked against sustainability, as it had
in the greater part of the 1990 s, 1980 s, and earlier; it had
now become a force that stimulated sustainability.
Remarkably, the key decisions leading to the creation of
a market for sustainable coffee were made in the executive
offices of lead companies, such as brand-owners and
retailers, as well as in standard-formulating organizations
and/or by social entrepreneurs who initiated new standards.
Consumers expressed their support for these decisions but
were not the main factors determining the course of events,
in part because, as one respondent formulated it, ‘‘con-
sumers could not make the distinction between the differ-
ent standards schemes, because they don’t know the
underlying differences.’’ Nevertheless, consumers played
an important role in that the market would not have taken
off, without the presence of a small segment of highly
involved and loyal Max Havelaar buyers. These consumers
ensure that sustainability remained an issue on the coffee
market for the years in which none of the big players in the
market responded to the issues. They, therefore, contrib-
uted to the continuing awareness of the great majority of
the consumers that companies could do something to solve
sustainability problems in coffee-growing countries. This
in turn created a basis for companies to differentiate their
brands. Once the first brands had taken their positions, the
issue changed from a matter of differentiation into a matter
of legitimacy. The more aware consumers became, the
more effective became the campaigns of NGOs targeted at
companies that had not yet adopted standards. The sus-
tainability issue, therefore, changed from a form of added-
value to a necessary requirement for legitimacy. By
pointing companies at their legitimacy, the NGOs therefore
played an important role (and still play that role) in the
continuing increase of the market share of sustainable
coffee in the Netherlands.
Also remarkable is the small role that the government
played in the creation of the Dutch market for sustainable
coffee. Policy-makers generally saw unsustainable choices
of consumers as a market failure that can be solved by
removing the information asymmetry. With the introduc-
tion of the Max Havelaar coffee, the information asym-
metry problem was solved in their eyes and they believed
that the government did not have any other instruments to
change the situation. It would take until 2010, when the
Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and
Innovation explicitly supported the Memorandum of
Understanding, that government started to actively promote
sustainable procurement. This result has encouraged us to
rethink the role of Fair Trade. Indeed, as this study sug-
gests, Fair Trade is rapidly achieving its main objectives on
the Dutch coffee market. However, it achieves these
objectives with the help of other organizations, and the
process of change is actually beyond the control of those
who initiated it. The introduction of Max Havelaar labeled
coffee in the supermarket was not the spark that initiated
the creation of a market for certified coffee in the Neth-
erlands. In that respect, it took too long before incumbents
in the industry responded. It was Fair Trade, however, that
started the development of market creation. According to
Douque´, ‘‘the knock-on effect of Max Havelaar was much
larger than that of Utz or Rainforest.’’
Fair Trade did not become the new rule; it became the
standard against which others could compare themselves
and upon which they could build to develop new standards
that would be more feasible in their business models. Fair
Trade played a key role in the process but needed the co-
existence of others to create a market for sustainable cof-
fee. Raynolds (2009) suggests that mainstreaming Fair
Trade introduces market-driven motivations in the Fair
Trade community. Our study reaffirms her findings in that
the motivations of mainstream coffee roasters who began
producing Max Havelaar coffee and the motivations of the
market leader to prevent its introduction were both market-
driven. This, however, does not mean that a higher market
share for Fair Trade is always better (even at the expense of
more pragmatic standards). Because Fair Trade should
Floor initiatives
(4C)
CSR Concepts
(Utz Kapeh/Certified and Rainforest Alliance)
Consumer labels
(Max Havelaar / Fair Trade)
Fig. 3 Pyramid of change
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fulfill a role as the standard of comparison, it can provide a
critical mirror to other organizations. One way of doing
this is by showing that, although the organization is smaller
in size, the farmers that are Fair Trade-certified make more
progress in developing their livelihoods than those certified
by other organizations.
In addition, we note that the scope of sustainability
standards has also broadened over the years. Fair Trade
began with the goal of improving the position of local
farmers in the Third World, but over time, as other stan-
dards were introduced in the market, other issues became
more prominent, such as maintaining biodiversity. Thus,
the market for sustainable coffee started with focus on a
single issue but gradually broadened to include other sus-
tainability issues.
Implications
The case on the creation of a market for sustainable coffee
in the Netherlands offers important lessons for the ways in
which policy-makers can use market forces to achieve
sustainability objectives. Our findings suggest that policy-
makers should ensure that a consumer label identifying
sustainable products exists in the market, although the
market share of the labeled product is not of major
importance as long as the share is big enough to support a
viable business. Rather, the case results suggest that con-
sumers should be aware of the label, even if they do not
purchase the labeled product on a routine basis. Next,
policy-makers may support the emergence of other stan-
dards systems that provide lead companies with sustain-
ability standards that are feasible within the business
models of those companies. Finally, our findings imply that
policy-makers should allow the co-existence of multiple
standard systems to allow the building of brand alliances
between brands and standards systems.
Business managers may also draw important lessons
from this case because it shows that sustainability issues
can best be handled proactively. Otherwise, the issue may
enter the market environment in ways that create oppor-
tunities for new competitors, and, over time, it may change
the rules of competition on the market. In the Dutch coffee
market this may have created new opportunities for some
companies, but for others (the larger and more established
companies in the market), it created threats that could have
been avoided by early recognition of the changing norms in
the institutional environment and an active response to
those changes.
Finally, our study has implications for future research.
This case study has focused on one product and one
country. The generalizability of the current findings may be
tested in other countries and with other products, for
example other food products, like meat, or non-food
products, like sustainable lumber or apparel, leading to a
deeper understanding of how markets can stimulate sus-
tainable development. The emergence of new standard-
formulating organizations seems to be leading to the
development of a ‘‘sustainability standards industry’’ in its
own right. Future research may examine this ‘‘industry,’’ its
development, and the emerging rules of the game and
strategies across industries. Jointly, these organizations
change practices in major product markets; their role as a
force for sustainable development deserves more
recognition.
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Appendix 1: Case Study Methodology
A case study approach was selected as the principal method
for gaining in-depth information about the underlying
developments in the market for Fair Trade coffee in the
Netherlands (Yin 2003). In order to reconstruct the devel-
opments in the Dutch coffee market after the introduction
of the first Fair Trade coffee, we relied on a variety of
sources. Primary data were collected by conducting 16
interviews with experts, individuals directly involved in
initiating Fair Trade coffee, and individuals who could
inform us about the strategies pursued by incumbent
companies. In order to obtain insight into developments in
the market from different perspectives, we selected inter-
viewees representing a range of functions in, or relation-
ships with, the organizations in question (Yin 2003). We
made sure that we had respondents who could inform us
about critical changes in the market from firsthand expe-
rience. These respondents were either approached directly
through their current or former employers or approached
upon the recommendations of other informants, following a
snowballing procedure. For companies that played an
important role in the Dutch coffee market, at least two
people from each organization were interviewed. To obtain
information on general trends from independent infor-
mants, several interviews were conducted with industry
experts, such as consultants.
For each interview, a separate and unique protocol was
developed, beginning with general questions about the
development of the market and trends that influenced it and
ending with more specific questions on the role that the
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respondent (or her/his organization) had played in specific
phases of the market, discussed in chronological order.
These protocols functioned as guidelines for semi-struc-
tured interviews. The interviews, which lasted between one
and a half and two hours, took place in the interviewees’
offices. The researchers taped all interviews and then made
full transcripts. Subsequently, the transcripts were coded
using the software program Atlas.ti. Both the transcription
and the coding occurred immediately after each interview
(rather than being postponed until after the final interviews
were completed).
In order to enable data triangulation, we also conducted
intensive desk research from articles, newspapers, annual
reports, company reports, and public sources such as
websites. These supplementary data sources provided
background and additional information to the findings from
the interviews. Moreover, for each organization repre-
sented in the interviews, additional information sources
were collected; comparing this information with that
obtained in interviews increased the reliability of our
findings, especially when informants were relying on
memory to answer questions about events that happened
years earlier (Yin 2003).
Appendix 2: Teaching Material
Teaching Notes
In this appendix, you may find some questions that can be
used for classroom discussion of the case study. The case
study described in this article can be distributed in its
entirety for first or second year undergraduate students.
However, for students who are in their final years, we
advise lecturers to remove the discussion and conclusion
sections from the paper before distributing it to the students
to allow the students to draw more of their own
conclusions.
Questions
1. Why do you think that, before the introduction of
Max Havelaar, predictions of its future market share
were wrong?
2. When Neuteboom decided to produce Fair Trade
coffee, they promptly visited the Fair Trade coffee
farmers. Why do you think they did that?
3. Why did companies ignore Fair Trade after its
introduction? Was that a wise decision?
4. Besides Fair Trade, what were the main develop-
ments in the coffee market that led to main-
streaming?
5. What lessons did Utz draw from the experiences of
Max Havelaar?
6. DE established a foundation in 2002 that financed
projects with coffee farmers, but that activity didn’t
affect the company’s core processes. Why is it
important that CSR initiatives be developed in
conjunction with core processes?
7. What was the reason that the founding organization
of Max Havelaar also started to support Utz Kapeh?
8. Explain why the development of a market for
sustainable coffee throughout the years can be seen
as both a desirable marketing strategy for companies
and a necessary requirement for legitimacy.
9. Institutional theory suggests that standards are devel-
oped in response to external pressure. Can you
describe the pressures that led to the standards that
are described in this case study?
10. Give a number of reasons why consumers are only a
very small factor in the development of a market for
sustainable coffee?
11. Select another industry in which sustainability is an
important issue and evaluate the extent to which
developments in that industry are comparable to the
developments described in this case study.
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